I. KILBURN AND JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
Kilburn is likely to provoke extensive jurisdictional discovery-discovery " [t] o determine whether the defendant is immune from suit."' 2 Such discovery is likely when the exception to sovereign immunity that the plaintiff wishes to invoke 13 is legally or factually difficult for her to justify or is susceptible to a defendant's attack.
The FSIA lifts foreign sovereign immunity with respect to several different categories of action.' 4 A prospective plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to fit her case into one of these categories. 5 In assessing whether a plaintiff has managed to do so, courts sometimes need only engage in straightforward legal analysis, as when the category the plaintiff invokes requires them to discern whether an alleged act constitutes torture.' 6 Sometimes, however, courts have to parse complicated facts' 7 or apply ambiguous legal standardsf. The Kilburn holding -that plaintiffs need only plead proximate cause in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction -will require courts to engage in complicated factual inquiries. For example, courts will have to follow convoluted money trails and understand the relationships between various terrorist cells. (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that when a defendant challenges the factual predicate for a court's assertion of'jurisdiction, the court should order discovery).
13. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Brown) (arguing that " [b] eyond ensuring that American citizens have recourse after brutal terrorist acts, this section represents a vital counterterrorism measure," and noting that "I am confident that the threat of enforceable judgments and levies against assets from U.S. courts will be a significant inducement for countries to get themselves off the State Department's terrorist list").
36. DELLAPENNA, supra note 24, at 418 & n.578, 420 n.594.
37.
Once a sovereign has appeared in court, the sovereign is more likely than not to see litigation through to its completion. Indeed, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity emerged in part from cases in which sovereigns made special appearances to contest jurisdiction and ended up litigating claims and counterclaims. See, e.g., The Sao Vicente v. Finally, extensive jurisdictional discovery undermines Congress's efforts to deter terrorists. If the Sudan is not only considered liable for damages wrought by al Qaeda long after the Sudan ejected Osama bin Laden," s but also must disclose sensitive material when contesting such liability, it will have little incentive to cooperate with U.S. courts. Disclosures may be embarrassing and the resulting shame may be an additional sanction. 3 9 Moreover, it is not clear whether, in the international sphere, disclosure of malfeasance induces compliance with or deviance from international law. 4 "
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE DISCOVERY DEBACLE
I propose two solutions to the problem I have identified -that Kilburn will require courts to engage in extensive jurisdictional discovery. First, U.S. courts should require plaintiffs to plead that a foreign sovereign knew of or intended to support specific terrorist acts-not that her injuries were merely the proximate result of support provided to a terrorist organization -before ordering jurisdictional discovery. The D.C. Circuit considered this argument but failed to realize that the only way courts can affect the amount of discovery required is by changing the pleading requirements. 4 The D.C. Circuit also failed to consider the specific international law ramifications of its decision. 4 2 Requiring plaintiffs to plead knowledge or intent would be consistent with the FSIA's goals 43 and, although it would not make causation a legal question, it would reduce the number of fact questions that would come before the court .. cheating to be, the more likely he or she is to cheat too."). If nations become aware of the extent to which other nations derogate from international requirements, they may be induced to follow suit.
41.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (arguing that by permitting the resolution of legal questions rather than requiring the investigation of factual puzzles Congress makes determinations of jurisdiction easier). Nor does this proposal undermine Congress's efforts to provide a remedy for victims of terrorism. Plaintiffs are often in the best position to unearth the facts that might justify an assertion of jurisdiction, and they should be required to explore avenues open to them without court assistance before discovery is granted. For instance, in Beecham v. Libya, the question was whether a U.S. military officer "received national defense information... that the instructions for the La Belle attack had been sent from the Libyan government."" 0 The plaintiffs could readily have sought that information from the United States before demanding it from Libya. 
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Second, I propose that when a sovereign defendant objects to discovery, the court should permit it to submit discoverable material in camera and ex parte.' If foreign nations were assured that the information they submitted would not be disclosed to the public, foreign sovereigns might be more inclined to participate in litigation and might be more likey to abjure sponsorship of future terrorist acts.
Again, this proposal is not unrealistic. Congress seems to have contemplated in passing the FSIA that courts would permit foreign sovereigns and their agents to invoke privileges analogous to those the United States and its officers may invoke. 2 This scheme would also be consistent with notions of international comity. As the Supreme Court has explained, discovery "asymmetries" are frowned upon."
CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I have sought to demonstrate why Kilburn is inconsistent with the FSIA scheme. Although the Kilburn causation standard is not inherently problematic, the case is likely to have far-reaching effects on the scope and frequency of jurisdictional discovery ordered under the Act. I urge courts not to adopt the Kilburn standard. Rather, courts should impose more stringent pleading requirements up front and take greater care to protect the interests of foreign sovereigns. The United States is better served when foreign nations show up in court than when they are deterred from climbing the courthouse steps by the threat of burdensome discovery requests. 
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